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WHAT OF THE WORLD COURT NOW?

C. Sumner Lobingier*
"There will be no World Court if this ... cannot be made one and
whether it is to be, in the fullest sense, a World Court, depends upon
our own action." HUGHES
"Either the United States will join the World Court now established ... or we will not be a party to any." KELLOGG

I
INTRODUCTORY .

The Permanent Court of International Justice 1 was expressly provided for in the League of Nations Covenant (Article XIV) of 1919
and the "Statute" creating it was drafted by an advisory committee of
the League, meeting at the Hague, and opened for signature in the
follo~ing year. By 1921 the ratifications of twenty-eight states put it
into effect and the Court was formally opened, with a full quorum of
judges, on February 15 (Bentham's birthday) 1922. For nearly twenty
years it continued to function and its sessions were suspended only by
the presence of the Nazi invaders of the Netherlands.
It was more than a year from the Court's opening session before
United States authorities moved toward adherence. On February 24,
1923, the Protocol of signature was transmitted to the Senate by President Coolidge with a letter from Secretary of State Hughes asking
favorable action. It was nearly three years before a vote was taken and

*

B.A., M.A., LL.M., Ph.D., D.C.L., Univ. of Nebraska; D.Jur., Soochow Univ.,
China; J.U.D., National University; Former Judge, Court of First Instance, Philippines; Former Judge, United States Court for China (awarded the Order and Decoration of the Chiao Ho by the Chinese Gov't on completing 20 years of judicial service);
Securities & Exchange Commission Officer since 1934; formerly teacher of law in University of Nebraska, the Philippine Law School, the Comparative Law School of China,
National University and other law schools; Author: THE PEOPLE'S LAW (1910), EvoLuTION OF THE RoMAN LAw (1923); THE BEGINNINGS OF LAw, A.B.A. CoMPARATIVE
LAw BUREAU BULLETIN (1933) and numerous articles in legal and other encyclopedias
and periodicals.-Ed.
1
Popularly known as the "World Court" to distinguish it from the so-called Permanent Court ·of Arbitration. See infra note 17.
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then only after a motion to close the debate had been adopted. By a
margin of seventy-six to seventeen ( three not voting) the Senate on
January 27, 1926, voted 2 to "advise and consent to adherence"; but
embodied in its resolution five reservations s and three provisos. "The
substance of four of the reservations had been proposed by Secretary of
State Hughes" and were all accepted by "a conference of signatories of
the original court protocol at Geneva in I 92 6"; but the Senate had added
a fifth reservation of two parts, concerning "advisory opinions." The
first part was accepted by the conference; "but as to the second ... they
set' certain conditions." 4 The first proviso permitted "recourse to the
Permanent Court . . . only by agreement thereto through general or
special treaties." 5 This would have been a very serious obstacle to our
government's utilization of the Court; 6 but it would not have prevented
adherence from taking effect. 7
That result might have followed from another clause precluding
2

67 CoNG. REc. 2824-2825 (1926).
This was the method which had been used successfully to reject the Versailles
Treaty and the League of Nations. J:ormer Senator James E. Watson in his book As I
KNEW THEM quotes Senator Lodge as telling him, "I do not propose to beat it [ the
Treaty] by direct frontal attack but by the indirect method of reservations." See NEW
YoRK TIMES MAG., Aug. 20, 1944, 14 at 38:3.
4
See Hudson, "The World Court-As Things Now Stand," 21 A.B.A.J. 144 at
145 (1935). The second part of Reservation 5 provided "nor shall it, without the consent of the United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any
dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest." 67 CoNG.
REc. 2825 (1926).
The Protocol of Sept. 14, 1929 "accepted the special conditions attached by the
United States in the five reservations mentioned above to its adherence to the said
protocol upon the terms and c~nditions set forth in the following articles...· ." Art. 5
required the Secretary General of the League of Nations to "inform the United States
of any proposal before the ..• League for obtaining an advisory opinion"; the United
States Government's objection was given the force of a vote and its amicable withdrawal, in case its objection was overruled, was provided. 25 AM. J. INT. L. (Supp.)
58-61 (1931).
5
See the Resolution, 67 CoNG. REc. 2825 (1926).
.
6
" • • • To accept the jurisdiction of a World Court, with the reservation that a
compromis requiring the consent of two-thirds of the Senate must precede the submission of any dispute, would not ... confer obligatory jurisdiction." Corbett, "World
Order-An Agenda for Lawyers" 28 AM. J. INT. L. 207 at 216 (1934).
" ..• Here once more was clearly presented the Senate's demand to exercise its
constitutional prerogative of allowing no dispute to be referred by the Executive to the
Court without an approving vote in each case by the Senate." WIGMORE, GumE TO
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 294-295 (1943).
" ... it is now in actual practice more difficult to secure international arbitration
than ••• in the early days of our independence." MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND
SoME CURRENT ILLUSIONS 86 (1924).
7
" • • • it would seem to constitute merely a declaration of American constitutional
policy." Hudson, "The United States and the Permanent Court of International Justice" 20AM. J. INT. L. 330 at 334 (1926).
3
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signature to the Protocol "until the powers signatory to such protocol
shall have indicated, through an exchange of notes, their acceptance of
the foregoing reservations and understandings" 8 had the sufficiency of
the acceptance ever been questioned. Apparently it had not been; for
the executive branch proceeded on the assumption that the Conference
of Signatories accepted the "reservations and undertakings." 0
Such being the case was it necessary to resubmit the entire question
of adherence to the Senate which had voted overwhelmingly to adhere
and had not required resubmission? Should not the Senate have been
asked at most for a simple resolution accepting the condition, which
could, (and the results indicate, would) have been voted by a majority? 1 ° For the requirement in the Constitution, Article III (3), is for
"advice and consent ... to make treaties"; and a resolution accepting a
condition is hardly a "treaty." Other measures may be adopted or
repealed by a majority vote and the ratification of a treaty is not impaired by the passage of a resolution purporting to interpret it.11
However, the State Department seems to have advised President
Hoover differently; for, after waiting "a year and a day" from the date
of signature, he transmitted to the Senate "for its consideration and action" the same three Protocols,12 thereby tossing the whole question
back to the Senate which, after waiting until January 29, r935, voted
fifty-two to thirty-six for the Protocols.18
8

67 CONG. REC. 2825 (1926).
"On December 9, 1929, by direction of President Hoover, three Court·Protocols
were signed on behalf of the United States-( l) the original Protocol of Signature of
December 16, 1920; (2) the United States Accession Protocol, of 1929; and (3) the
1929 Protocol on Revision of the Court's Statute." Hudson, "The World Court-As
Things Now Stand," 21 A.B.A.J. 144 (1935) mentioned supra note 4.
10
·
"The l 929 Protocol on. American Accession constitutes an out-and-out acceptance of the first four of the Senate's reservations, and of the first half of the fifth
reservation. On this point, there can be no warranted doubt. It clearly constitutes also
an acceptance of the second part of the Senate's fifth reservation 'upon the terms and
conditions set out,' and these terms and conditions leave the United States adequately
and abundantly protected in its special position. Mr. Root has explained that the United
States can at any time prevent any request for an advisory opinion from bei~g considered by the Court. Moreover, the United States can at any time denounce the whole
scheme and withdraw from supporting the Court." Id. at 145.
E.g. the resolution admitting (annexing) Texas was adopted by less than a twothirds vote. So was the resolution annexing Hawaii. See BEARD, BASIC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 189, 344( 1944).
11 Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 at 180, 22 S. Ct. 59
( I 90 I) where such a resolution was declared "absolutely without legal significance on
the question before us."
12
74 CoNG. REc. 504 (1930); 25 AM. J. INT, L. (Supp.) 49 (1931).
18
79 CoNG. REc. II47 (1935).
9
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As the yea vote was less than two-thirds, the general assumption
has been that it rejected the original I920 Protocol; 13 a but did it? Adherence, it must be remembered, had been oyerwhe~ingly voted in
I926 and the Supreme Court had meanwhile decided in a comparable
case 14 that such action, once taken, would be irrevocable. Nor did the
I935 Resolution purport to revoke that of I_926. Moreover the I935
yea vote gave a substantial majority, (sixteen), for all three Protocols,15
including that of I929 which included the acceptance of conditions re- ,
lating to the fifth Reservation ( second part) arid that alone under the
I926 vote stood between the Senate and the Conference of Signatories.
Nevertheless, the I935 vote, under the interpretation given _it by
the State Department, ended, for the time being and after twelve years
of effort, one of the saddest chapters in American history. Here was an
opportunity which mankind had awaited from the dawn of civilization
and a small minority of the Senate was able to treat it as a phase of
petty "patronage.ms And while other nations were utilizing, and
profiting by the World Court ours has been' compelled to "muddle
through" with no better agency than the so-called "Permanent Court
of International Arbitration," which is not a "court" at all in the conventional sense, ·as it merely provides boards of arbitration ad hoc. 17
lSa See HUDSON, THE PERMANENT CouRT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 236
(1943).
14
United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 52 S. Ct. 475 (1932). Hence the vote of
Jan. 29, 1935 did not effect revocation.
·
15
79 CONG. REC. 1147 (1935).
16 W1GMORE, GUIDE TO AMERICAN INTERNATION,µ. LAW AND PRACTICE 295-296
(1943).
.
17
During the decade, 1922-1932 "only three cases were referred to such tribunals, and in two of these the parties included the United States ••• the comparison
[between it and the World Court] would seem to indicate beyond dispute that it is not
adequate for meeting the needs of this century." Hudson, "The Permanent Court of
International Justice," 2 foAHO L. J. 22 at 26 (1932). In his latest work the same
author observes that "the fact that the national groups in the Permanent Court of
Arbitration were given the function of nominating candidates in the election of members of the Permanent Court of International Justice has tended to assure the continuance of the Permanent Court of Arbitration." HUDSON, THE PERMANENT CouRT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 36 (1943).
But if all these groups~accept the farmer's compulsory jurisdiction, and only a few
have not, that slender ground for, retaining the latter will disappear. On Feb. 24, 1944,
however, the President approved the designation of Henry L. Stimson and Michael F.
Doyle as members of the panel.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration "is not a deciding tribunal, but a list of
names, out of which the parties in each case select, and thereby constitute the Court,"
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 3d ed., § 476b (1920).
1
" ••• there was in the decisions of the Permanent Court of Arbitration neither the
necessary tradition of continuity, with the resulting advantage of relative certainty, nor
the assurance that the law administered by it would be good law. There was no assurance
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Meanwhile proposals have been made for a Western Hemisphere
international tribunal. At the special Inter-American Conference
(Buenos Aires, 1936) such proposals were all referred to the PanAmerican Union. Its report was duly made but the Lima Conference
went no farther than to declare an alleged intention to establish such a
court. Meeting simultaneously with that conference was the InterAmerican "Committee of Experts" ( created by the Montevideo Conference, 1933) which considered the so-called "Mexican Peace Code"
providing, inter alia, for "an Inter-American Court of Justice to sit in
two banes of eleven judges each, one from each American country, including Canada." 18 The Committee, however, "submitted a redraft."
That such proposals have made little headway has been partly due to
the desire not to interfere with the Permanent Court of International
that the decisions of the arbitrators chosen from the panel called the Permanent Court
of Arbitration would serve a purpose other than that of disposing of the dispute between
the parties. They did not, in a word, with sufficient authority develop and clarify international law." LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
PERMANENT CouRT OF INTERNATIONAL JusTicE 3 (1934).
Historically this original Hague tribunal may be compared to that established under
our Articles of Confederation. Indeed, the resemblance is so close, both in composition
and procedure, as to suggest that the latter was the former's model:
"The United States in congress assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in
all disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two
or more states concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other cause whatever; which
authority shall always be exercised in the manner following: Whenever the legislative
or executive authority or lawful agent of any state in controversy with another, shall
present a petition to congress, stating the matter in question, and praying for a hearing,
notice thereof shall be given by order of congress to the legislative or executive authority
of the state in controversy and a day assigned for the appearance of the parties by their
lawful agents, who shall then be directed to appoint, by joint consent, commissioners or
judges to constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in question: but if
they cannot agree, congress shall name three persons out of each of the united states
and from the list of such persons, each party shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not
less than seven nor more than nine names, as congress shall direct, shall, in the presence
of congress, be drawn out by lot and the persons whose names shall be so drawn or any
five of them, shall be commissioners or judges to hear and finally determine the controversy, so always as a major part of the judges who shall hear the cause, shall agree in
the determination." Article IX of the Articles of Confederation, July 9, 1778, HISTORY
OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION .536 (1941).
The case of Pennsylvania v. Connecticut ( l 782) involving sovereignty of the
Wyoming Valley was adjudicated under this clause in 1783. See 6 AM. J. INT. L. 316
at 338 (1912).
18
See Fenwick, "The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace,"
31 AM. J. INT. L. 201 (1937); Finch, "Eighth International Conference of American
States," 34 id. 714 (1940); Borchard, "The 'Committee of Experts' at the Lima
Conference," 33 id. 269 at 280 (1939).

/
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Justice; 10 but the project is 1ikely to encounter other objections if revived after the present con:flict.20

II
THE

wORLD COURT'S ACHIEVEMENTS, PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE
I

I.

It has Functioned Efficiently and with Distinction for over

a Score of Years
a. Consensus of Expert Opinion
Three eminent (pre-Hitler) German publicists-Stau:ffenberg,21
Lauterpacht 22 and Schwarzenberger 23-whose opportunities and qualifications were unusual, have analyzed and appraised the Court's work
19

At Buenos Aires "the chief division of opinion was between those who believed
that an American court might command greater confidence on the part of the American
Republics and might be much more readily accessible, and those who felt that the proposed court would duplicate the functions of the Permanent Court of International Justice and detract from its authority." Fenwick, "The Inter-American Conference for
the Maintenance of Peace," 31 AM. J. INT. L. 201 at 209 (1937).
20
An Inter-American Court would necessarily be created by the joint action of
twenty-one states, all but one of which (the United States) are Latin American. A
panel of judges which should fail to reflect this preponderance would most probably
not satisfy Latin America. TJie Mexican proposal, e.g., would provide twenty Latii?American judges and only two other&; Panama with little more than half a million
population and Paraguay with less than one million would have equal representation with
the United States (138,000,000). That such a proposal would en.counter fierce opposition from the isolationists, is evident from the debates preceding the final vote. See
e.g. the speech of Senator Trammel of Florida just before the vote was taken on Jan.
29, 1935. 79 CoNG. REc. l 145 (1935). Cf. reports of the closing session of The
Inter-American Bar Association, Aug. 1, 1944.
21
". • • the vigorous way in which the Court is fulfilling this task . . . [ the development of international law] clearly appears even from the few rulings we have
mentioned." Stauffenberg, "What the World Court Has Done So Far," 7 TEMPLE L.
REv. 315 at 328 (1933).
22
" • • • this Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague has-independently of its primary purpose of being the supreme instrument of peace-proved a
powerful factor in developing international law." LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PERMANENT CouRT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 24
(1934).
" ... The Court as an institution is nothing else than the spirit of its pronouncements from its very inception. It is not in the long run a permanent court so far as its
composition is concerned. Members of the Court come and go. The present Court
includes only a very small proportion of judges who served. on the Court elected by the
Assembly and Council in 1921. The permanence of the Court is a tendency and a
method of approach transcending the continuity of its membership. It is comforting
to know that that spirit is not divorced from the progress of international life, but that it
has been an agency of its integration and development." Id. at 88.
23
"If this survey has shewn that the Permanent Court has, practically unobserved,
made an essential contribution to the development of a new branch of international law,
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most favorably. A well known English writer 24 on international law
finds "Permanent Court decisions," including advisory opinions, "of
binding authority (in English courts) ... in cases relating to treaties''
and "o:t high persuasive authority in ... questions of customary international law." Highly favorable also has been the weight of expert professional opinion on this side of the Atlantic.25
it has fulfilled its purpose." Schwarzenberger, "The Development of International
Economic and Financial Law by the Permanent Court of International Justice,"
54 JuRm. REv. 21 at 99 (1942).
24
Jenks, "The Authority in English Courts of Decisions of the Permanent Court,"
20 B. Y. B. INT. L. 1 (1939), who finds the Court, including its advisory opinions,
generally authoritative and controlling even over contrary expressions of the national
courts.
25
"The Permanent Court of International Justice is the culmination of a long
evolution in the field of international law. Fifty-three states have become parties to the
Statute, and practically all of the states of the world have conferred jurisdiction on the
Court. It should be strengthened and accepted as a universal instrument for the final
judgment of those disputes which lend themselves to legal settlement. More than five
hundred international treaties have been concluded, providing for the Court's jurisdiction, and most of them are now in force. To preserve this vast structure of treaty law,
continuity must be preserved and the Court maintained in all its authority." SHOTWELL,
CoMMISSION To STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, 4th rep., 15 (1943).
"The extensive use which has been and is being made of the Court is at once a
proof of the need for such an agency in the international affairs of our time and an
indication of the contemporary estimate which is placed upon its value ...." Already in
IO years, the Court has made a significant contribution. Hudson, "The Permanent
Court of International Justice," 2 IDAHO L. J. 26 (1932).
"All in all the World Court has decisively established itself. Indeed it is the one
indisputably serviceable contribution ·to international order promoted by the reaction
from the great [World] War [I]." Rogers, J. G., 7 RocKY MT. L. REv. 227 (1935).
''The record ..• beginning with the resolution adopted by the New York State
Bar Association in 1921, through five resolutions adopted by the American Bar Association in as many different years, ... is an unbroken [one] of approval ... expressed at
every stage of the public discussion • • . [ of] the several proposals for American participation.••• The state bar associations of no fewer than 32 states .•. have expressed
themselves, as have many local bar associations. . . •" HuDsoN, IN RE THE WoRLD
CouRT, A.B.A. Publication, 3-4 (1934).
" ••. So far as can be ascertained from published reports, in all of these years ng
bar association in the United States has adopted a resolution opposing American support
of the Court." IN RE THE WoRLD CouRT, A.B.A. Publication, 4 (1934), containing
a list of I 50 resolutions (many of which are reprinted) relating to the Court.
"In supporting the World Court . • • we lose nothing that we could otherwise
preserve; ..• we enhance rather than impair our ultimate security; and we heighten the
mutual confidence which rests on demonstrated respect for the essential institutions of
international justice." C. E. Hughes, "The World Court as a Going Concern," 16
A.B.A. 151 at 157 (1930). Cf. Kellogg, "The World Court," 14 MINN. L. REv.
]II at 723 (1930). See also address of John W. Davis, N. J. ST. BAR AssN. Y. B. 137
(1930-1931); Battle, "The United States. and the World Couit," 15 VA. L. REv.
643 (1929).
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b. Some of its Contributions to International Law and Order
(r) Exposition and Exegesis
(a) Clarification. "The Court ..• is ... an organ of international
law;'' said Judge Anzilotti 26 and the former has consistently treated the
latter as a legal system in the making and not as a mere collection of
doctrinaire opinion.21 And if at times, the Court has seemed to follow
the "positivistic tradition," 28 a closer analysis reveals that the "free will
of states" from which international law is said to "emanate" 29 may be
manifested by "usagds generally accepted." 30 The Court has also been
watchful to see that the field of international law is not curtailed.31
(b) Canons of interpretation. The most extensive phase of the
26
Danzig, Legislative Decrees, 3 World Ct. Rep. 513 at 534 (Ser. A/B, No. 65,
1935). Cf..Diversion of Water from the River M~use, 4 World Ct. Rep: 172 at 232
(Ser. A/B, N'o. 70, 1937) and citations.
"The very existence of the Court, when coupled with the substantial measure of
obligatory jurisdiction conferred upon it, must have proved a factor of importance in
maintaining the rule of law ••• the Court has consciously and, with few exceptions, consistently fulfilled its ••• function .•• the developing of international law." LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT oF INTERNATIONAL LAw BY THE PERMANENT CouRT OF
INTERNATIONAL JusTicE 1, 2 (1934). Cf. id at 24.
·
27
"For the first time in modern history there has functioned an international institution of unprecedented authority able and competent to probe the legal value of some
of the traditional pretensions. In the atmosphere of diplomatic negotiations and conferences these claims are high-sounding, uncompromising, clad in the garb of the
dignity of States, supported if necessary by a passage extracted from a work of a publicist.••• Prior to the establishment of the Permanent Court there was no agency to
disprove them and to show by clear and ti,nal decisions that they were one-sided, .arbitrary, and contrary to law. Such an agency has necessarily been found in the Court."
Id. at 104-105.
28
Steiner, "Fundamental Conceptions of International Law in the Jurisprudence
of the Permanent Court," 30 AM. J. INT. L. 414 (1936). But cf. LAUTERPACHT,
THE DEVELOPMENT oF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PERMANENT CouRT OF INTERNATIONAL JusTICE 82 (1934), wh.ere he says that Art. 38 of the statute "sounded the
death knell of rigid positivism in international law."
29
The S. S. Lotus, 2 World Ct. Rep. 20 (Sc,r. A, No. 10, 1927).
so Such a usage "is one generally accepted by the generality of states; not by every
single State•••• The Judgment in the Lotus case affords less comfort than is commonly
assumed to the orthodox doctrine of State sovereignty." LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE 103-104 (1934).
81
Thus nationality is not solely a subject of domestic jurisdiction, as contended by
France in its dispute with Britain over the application to British subjects of the nationality decrees of 1921, promulgated by the former in Morocco and Tunis. The Court
took jurisdiction of the case as a proper, subject of international law. I World Ct. Rep.
143 at 161-162 (Ser. B, No. 4, 1923).
In the Turkey-Iraq boundary case, I World Ct. Rep. 720 at 742-743 (Ser. B,
No. 12, 1925), the Court declined to hold that agents of the parties litigant must be
counted in order to constitute the unanimity required of the Council in calling for an
advisory opinion.
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Court's work thus far has been exegetical-the interpretation of public
instruments and other official acts. In performing it the Court has applied, and in some instances extended, interpretative canons long used by
the national tribunals. Foremost among these is the rule that the intention or design of the parties must govern; 82 but along with it, the
court's work has shown, "full use can be made of another hardly less
important principle ... res magis valeat quam pereat''-where two
constructions are possible, that will be adopted which will make the
instrument most effective.88 Contra proferente~the rule that an instrument must be construed most strongly against the maker, was applied in favor of certain bondholders.84 Pacta in favorem tertii--this is
a canon common to both Romanesque 85 and Anglican 86 legal systems in
construing agreements in which another than the immediate parties may
claim a share. The Permanent Court seems to have been the first to
recognize and apply it in the international field. 87
(c) Treaties, etc. Treaty making, said the Court,88 "is an attribute
of .•. sovereignty," not "an abandonment" thereof and "a treaty ...
creates law as between the States which are parties to it." 89 The first
82

International Labor Organization, l World Ct. Rep. 122 at 129 (Ser. B, Nos. 2
and 3, 1922); Turkey-Iraq boundary case, id. 720 at 732, 736 (Ser. B, No. 12, 1925);
Danzig Courts' Jurisdiction, 2 id. 236 at 247, 249 (Ser. B, No. 15, 1928).
88 LAuTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw BY THE PER•
MANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 69-70, (1934).
8
"' In the Matter of the Brazilian Bonds, 2 World Ct. Rep. 404 at 421 (Ser. A,
No. 21, 1929).
H See Williston, "Contracts for the Benefit of a Third Person in the Civil Law,"
16 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1902).
86
2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS c. 14 (1936).
87 The Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 2 World Ct. Rep. 448
at 464-465, 479 (Ser. A/B, No. 46, 1930).
" ••• The objection to pacta in favorem tertii is merely another expression of
theory, rejected by the Court, that limitations of State sovereignty must be interpreted
restrictively. It is also a manifestation of the opposition • • • [to] the possioilities of
international legislation implied in the recognition of [such] pacta • • • [which]
smooths the way for what has been called international settlements, by making possible
the creation of legal rights and obligations with an effect transcending the scope of the
original parties to the treaty. International settlements are incipient international legislation." LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw BY THE PER•
MANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 99-100 (1934).
But see Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 2 World Ct. Rep. 448
at 469, 479-480, 547 (Ser. A., No. 22, 1929).
88
The S. S. Wimbledon, 1 World Ct. Rep. 163 at 175 (Ser. A, No. 1, 1923).
Cf. Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, id. 421, (Ser. B, No. IO, 1925).
89
German Interests in Upper Silesia, l World Ct. Rep. 509 at 529 (Ser. A, No. 7,
1926).
"The engagement in the third paragraph is not a mere moral obligation, it is a

MICHIGAN LAW -REVIEW

[Vol. 43

subject specified in the statute fixing the Court's -compulsory jurisdiction is "the interpretation of a "treaty"; 40 its first official pronouncement 41 was an advisory exercise of such jurisdiction and "the bulk
of ... [its] work ... has been devoted" thereto. 42 Nor has this been
confined to treaties referred to it for interpretation.48 The experts are
quite unanimous in commending the manner in which this function has
been exercised.44
(d) Other Official Acts. But treaties are not the sole subjects of
exegesis by the Permanent Court. It has also exercised its jurisdiction

.

part of the treaty .•• by which the parties are bound." Oscar Chinn Case, 3 World
Ct. Rep: 418 (Ser. A/B, No. 63, 1934).
40
Art. 36 (a).
41
1 World Ct. Rep. 113 (Ser. B, No. 1, 1922).
42 LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PERMANENT CouRT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE So (1934).
48 The Court "has -repeatedly expressed the opinion that it had jurisdiction to
interpret treaty provisions other than those which the clause conferring jurisdiction authorized it to interpret if this was necessary for the fulfillment of its task." Id. at 59, citing
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Ser. A, No. 2 at p. 31 (1924) and German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Ser. A, No. 6 at p. 18 and No. 7 at p. 25 (1925, 1926).
44 "The difference between treaty interpre\a!ion by national tribunals as distinguished from international courts . . • lies in the fact that seldom, if ever, do the
national courts have as their litigant parties the respective contracting parties to the •••
treaty.•.• This ..• has allowed the court to construe particular clauses or provisions,
in the event of doubt or indefiniteness, more liberally than is the practice of the International -Court, where the strictest and finest ... niceties of interpretative distinction
are mandatory or else serious damage or inequality of rights will result to the advantage
of one of the contracting powers." Graske, "Some Aspects of Treaty Interpretation in
the United States-1930-1935," IO TULANE L. REV. 246 at 257 (1936).
See also note 31 supra; Hyde, "Interpretation of Treaties by the Permanent
Court of International Justice," 24 AM. J. INT. L. I (1930).
An early instance_ of liberal interpretation is found in the Court's advisory opinion
No. I 2, cited supra note 31, involving the Turkey-Iraq boundary where article 5 of the
League of Nations Covenant, requiring "the agreement of all members represented at the
meeting'' for "decisions of the assembly or council," as not including the parties litigant.
But in construing the Versailles Treaty (pt. XIII) the Court gave to the term
"industry'' as there used a meaning broad enough to include agriculture. Re International Labor Organization, I World Ct. Rep. 122 at 135 (Ser. B, No. 2, Ser. A,
No. 3, 19~2).
In construing art. 2 of the Lausam,1e Treaty, exempting from exchange "all Greeks
•.• established before Oct. 30, 1908 within ••. the ••• Prefecture of .•• Constantinople," the Court applied it to those who came from anywhere before that date with
the intention to reside. Exchange of Greek and Turkish-Populations, I World Ct. Rep.
421 at 437 (Ser. B, No. 10, 1925).
The Court declined to interpret a treaty between Russia and Finland upon the
latter's sole applic~tion, the former declining to participate. Re Eastern Carelia, 1
World Ct. Rep. 190 at 205 (Ser. B, No. 5, 1923).
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to construe mandates, 45 international statutes 46 and even municipal
law.41
(2) Assimilation of Laws
No legal subject is more intricate nor confusing than that which is
commonly given the title "Conflict of Laws." 48 What is needed in
that field is an authoritative tribunal which will gradually change the
"conflict" into an "assimilation" of laws. Here the Permanent Court
has an unique opportunity and has already made a beginning.49 In construing state loans it has adopted neither lex loci contractus nor lex loci
solutionis as such but has worked out rules of its own. 50

(3) Important Doctrines Applied and Extended
(a) Stare Decisis. Article 38 of the statute requires the Permanent
Court to apply " ( 2) International custom as evidence of a general custom ... 4. Subject to the provisions of Art. 59, judicial decisions"
45 In a series of judgments in l World Ct. Rep. 293 (Ser. A, No. 2, 1924); id.
355 (Ser. A, No. 5, 1925); 2 id. 99 (Ser. A, No. II, 1927), the Court interpreted
the mandate for Palestine granted by the League of Nations to Britain in 1922 and declared that the mandatary "would be bound to recognize the Jaffa concessions, not in
consequence of an obligation undertaken by [it] but in virtue of a general principle
of international law." I World Ct. Rep. 293 at 314 (Ser. A, No. 2, 1924).
As to termination of Mandates see L. H. Evans, "The General Principles Governing the Termination of a Mandate," 26 AM. J. INT. L. 735 (1932).
46
E.g., the League of Nations Covenant.
41
See Jenks, "The Interpretation and Application of Municipal Law by the Permanent Court of International Justice," 19 B.Y.B. INT. L. 67-103 (1938).
" ••• from the standpoint of International Law and the Court which is its organ,
municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of
States in the same manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures." German
Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, I World Ct. ;Rep. 510 at 521 (Ser. A, No. 7, 1926).
Here the Court was "certainly not called upon to interpret Polish law as such" but
passed "on the question whether or not, in applying that law, Poland is acting in conformity with its obligations towards Germany under the Geneva Convention." Id. at
521.
See also State St1cce1sion and Prioate Rights, infra p. 845.
48 "Definitions of the scope and character of the branch of law called Conflict of
Laws are almost as numerous as the writers in the field." Shon, "New Bases for Solution of Conflict of Laws Problems," 55 HARV. L. REv. 978 (1942).
49
See Steiner, "Fundamental Conceptions of International Law in the Jurisprudence of the Permanent Court," 30 AM. J. INT. L. 414 (1936).
50
"The Court ..• can determine what this law is only by reference to the actual
nature of these obligations and to the circumstances attendant upon their creation,
though it may also take into account, the expressed or presumed intention of the
Parties.~' Serbian Loans, 2 World Ct. Rep. 340 at 371 (Ser. A, No. 20, 1929) where
it applied the law of the debtor state to the substance of the debt and that of the lender
to "certain methods for the payment thereof''--e.g., the currency-upholding a clause
requiring payment in "gold francs."
The nice distinction here shown is in striking contrast with heated discussions
between schools of thought as to the "conflict of laws."
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etc., which, as Lauterpacht 51 points out, include its own. Under article
59 the Court's decision "has no binding force except between the parties," etc.; but that-seems to be nothing more than an equivalent of the
Anglican res adjudicata 52 which does not preclude the use of decisions
as precedents. In British prize law "the rule stare decisis applies" 53 and
the Permanent Court has consistently and continuously followed precedent. 54 In its very first judgment,55 enforcing article 3 80 of the ;versailles Treaty, opening the Kiel Canal "to vessels ... of all nations,"
it leaned heavily upon the usages followed by administrators of the
Suez and Panama Canals.56 Sometimes the doctrine is recognized in51
LAuTERPACHT, THE DEvELONMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw
MANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 5 (1934).
52

34 C.

BY

THE PER-

J. 742, § n54.

53

Kunz, "British Prize Cases, 1939-41," 36 AM. J. INT. L. 204 at 205 (1942).
54
" ••• a rule of law applied as decisive by the Court in one case should, according
to the principle stare decisis, be applied by the Court as far as possible in its subsequent
decisions." Ehrlich J. in Chorzow Factory, 1 World .Ct. Rep. 646 at 697 (Ser. A,
No. 17, 1927).
'
" .•• The Court follows its own decisions for the same reasons for which all courts
-whether bound by the doctrine of precedent or not-do it, namely, because such
decisions are a depository of legal experience to which it is convenient to adhere; because they embody what the Court thinks is the law; because respect for decisions given
in the past makes for continuity and stability which are of the essence of orderly administration of justice; and because judges do not like, if they can help it, to admit that
they were previously in the wrong. The cumulative effect of these factors is shown
clearly l;>y the way in which English Chancellors, administering the originally elastic and
flexible equity law, have by degrees learned to recognize the authority of case law with a
rigidity frequently surpassing that of the common law whose conservatism they set
themselves to combat. The Court relies on its own decisions for the reason which, more
than anything else, has caused the establishment of the formal doctrine of precedent in
England as distinguished from the Continent of Europe, namely, the absence of a code
or a generally recognized system of law which, like Roman law is an ever-present source
of development. Finally, it is to be expected that in a society of States in which the
opportunities for final and non-controversial statements of the law are rare, there
should be a tendency to find a fixed point in the flux of phrases or niere assertions of
power, and to regard judicial determinations as evidence or, what is in fact the same,
as a source of international law." LAuTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE CoURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 8 (1934).
55 S.S. Wimbledon, 1 World Ct. Rep. 163 (Ser. A, No. 1, 1923).
"Nothing has been advanced in the course of the present proceedings calculated
to alter the Courts opinion on this point." Germarl Interests in Polish Upper Silesia,
1 World Ct. Rep. 510 at 531 (Ser. A, No. 7, 1926), referring to Advisory Opinion
No. 6, id. 208 (Ser. B, No. 6, 1925);
.
"Following the precedent afforded by its Advisory Opinion No. 3...•"fGrecoTurkish Agreement of December, 1926, 2 World Ct. Rep. 320 at 329 (Ser. A, No. 6,

1928).
56

See Hoskins, "The Suez Canal as an International Waterway," 37 AM. J. INT. L.

373 (1943).

1 945]

WORLD COURT

directly, as by distinguishing the instant case from previous ones 57 or
by citing others which, while not, as we would say, "on all fours,"
nevertheless "throw light on the question." 58 With such a beginning, a
lawyer trained under the Anglican system need not hesitate to cite to
the World Court its own or other international law precedents nor fear
that they will be disregarded. 59
(b) Res Adjudicata. The Court has frequently applied the analogous, though not identical, doctrine of res adjudicata,6° in accordance
with the apparent intent of article 59 of the statute. In various cases 61
it has made that doctrine its ratio decidendi.
( c) State Succession and Private Rights. Pointing out that German law was "still in force in the territories ceded by Germany to Poland" the Court adjudicated the rights of settlers according to that
law.62 Where it was contended that claimant's title was not valid under
German law, the Court relied on the land registery where the title was
entered.68 In two later cases 6 ,1, the Court construed and upheld Turkish
concessions, incidentally passing on Ottoman Law in determining their
57

Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, I World Ct. Rep. 297 at 305 (Ser. A,
No. 2, 1924).
58
3 World Ct. Rep. 107 (Ser. A/B, No. 50, 1932).
59
" • • • the output of the court to date possesses a large degree of continuity and
system and Article 59 cannot be taken to have negatived an application of Anglo-American Doctrine of stare decisi.s.'' Hudson, "The Development of International Law Since
the War," 22 AM. J. INT. L. 330 at 347 (1928).
60
See note 52 supra. See the distinction between the two in Judge Ehrlich's
opinion, I World Ct. Rep. 646 at 697 (Ser. A, No. 17, 1928).
61
Polish Postal Service in Danzig, 1 World Ct. Rep. 440 at 459 (Ser. B, No. 11,
1925); Chorzow Factory, id. 624 at 636-638, 639, 640, 664, 692, 696, 697, 698 (Ser.
A, Nos. 13, 12, 1928); Jaworzina Case (Delimitation of the Czechoslovak-Polish Frontier), id. 253 (Ser. B, No. 8, 1923). Cf. Lighthouses in Crete and Samoa, 4 World
Ct. Rep. 241 at 247, 249 (Ser. A/B, No. 71, 1937); Societe Commerciale Belgique,
id. 470 at 484, 485, 488 (Ser. A/B, No. 178, 1939); Saint Naoum Monastery (Yugoslavia v. Albania) 1 World Ct. Rep. 391, 397 (Ser. B, No. 9, 1924), where an award of
a monastery to Albania by a conference of Ambassadors was upheld as res adjudicata.
In Minority Schools in Upper Silesia, 2 World Ct. Rep. 268 at 288-289 (Ser. A,
No. 15, 1928) the Court overruled a plea of res adjudicata.
62
German Settlers in Poland, I World Ct. Rep 207 at 224 (Ser. B, No. 6, 1923),
where it was observed:
"The fact that there was a political purpose behind the colonization scheme cannot affect the private rights acquired under the law" and the notion was repudiated that
"although the law survives, private rights acquired under it have perished. • . • Such
a contention is based on no principle and is contrary to an almost universal opinion and
practice." Id. at 226.
UUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PERMAN-,
ENT CouRT OF INTERNATIONAL JusTICE 97 (1934) terms this "a distinctive contribution to the law of State succession.''
68
German Settlers in Poland, 1 World Ct. Rep. 510 at 540 (Ser. A, No. 7, 1926).
64. Lighthouses Case, 3 World Ct. Rep. 368 (Ser. A/B, No. 62, 1934); 4 World
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validity. Magyar Law was likewise considered in another case 65 and
· found to support claimant's legal personality and title to lands in question.
( d) Equity. The statute 64 creating the Court negatively authorizes it "to decide a case ex aequo et bono if the parties agree." Judge
Kellogg thought that this merely empowered it "to apply the principle
of equity and justice in the broader signification of this latter word"; 67
but the Court has more than once invoked doctrines common to the
Anglican equity system. 68 In the Meuse Diversion case 69 the Court
virtually applied the equitable maxim,7° "he who seeks equity must do
equity.'m In a later case 72 "the general principle of subrogation" was ·
recognized as regards concessions granted a Greek subject by the Turkish government in Palestine, although that principle had "always ,been
denied by British Courts." 78 In the matter of the Serbian bonds 74 the
Ct. Rep. 241 at· 248, 253 (Ser. A/B, No. 71, 1937). See also Free Zones of Upper
Savoy and the District of Gex, id. at 448, 546 (Ser. A, No. 22, 1932).
" ••• The Administration of Palestine would be bound to recognize the Jaffa concessions, not in consequence of an obligation undertaken by the Mandatory [Britain]
but in virtue of a general principle of international law..•." Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions, 1 World Ct. Rep. 293 at 314 (Ser. A, No. 2, 1924). That the concessionaire was erroneously described as an Ottoman subject was not considered fatal in the
absence of proof to that effect under Ottoman law.
65
Peter Pazmany University, 3 World Ct. Rep. 315 (Ser. A/B, No. 61, 1933).
66
Art. 38 (4).
67 Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 2 World Ct. Rep. 484 at
506 (Ser. A, No. 24, 1930).
68
" • • • A decision ex aequo et bono is based on equity, and equity is a general
principle . . . recognized at least by the Anglo-Saxon nations." Kelsen, "Compulsory
Adjudication of International Disputes," 37 AM. J. INT. L. 397 at 406 (1943).
In the Polish-Czech boundary dispute the Court said of the delimitation Commission's power to propose modification, "since the object of this clause is one of equity it
must not be interpreted in too rigid a manner." I World Ct. Rep. 253 at 275 (Ser.
B, No. 8, 1923).
,
69
4 World Ct. Rep. 172 (Ser. C, No. 81, 1937).
76
Cited by Judge Hudson in a separate concurring opinion (id. at 229-234)
pointing out its Roman antecedent in the exceptio non adempleti contractus.
71 "The Court cannot refrain from comparing the case of the Belgian lock with
that of the Netherlands lock at Bosscheveld. Neither . . . constitutes a feeder, yet
both ••• discharge their lock-water into the canal and thus take part in feeding it with
water otherwise than through the treaty feeder, though without producing an excessive
current in the Zuid-Willemsvaart. In these circumstances, the Court finds it difficult to
admit the Netherlands are ••• warranted in complaining of the construction and operation of a lock of which they •.. set an example ..•." IL at 196.
72
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, I World Ct. Rep. 297 at 314 (Ser. A,
No. 2, 1924). Cf. Lighthouses case, 3 id. 368 at 389, 397 (Ser. C, No. 74, 1931).
Cf. Lighthouses in Crete and Samoa, 4 id. 241, 253-4, 265 (Ser. A/B, No. 71, 1937).
73 LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PER-

98 (1934).
2 World Ct. Rep. 344 (Ser. A, No. 20, 1929).
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Court recognized, though it considered inapplicable, "the principle
known in Anglo-Saxon law as estoppel." 75

(4) Other Notable Phases of its Work
(a) Boundary Disputes. These have always been a fruitful source
of wars, and territorial changes following World War I brought many
such problems to the fore. While the Permanent Court has not yet
been called upon "to trace the actual frontier line," 76 ( a task for a
diplomatic or legislative, rather than judicial, body) it has announced
guiding principles. 77 In an advisory opinion 78 it had upheld the belated
decision of a Conference of Ambassadors, providing for a delimitation
which was "empowered to propose any modifications" ( without fixing a
time limit) of the frontier line. 79
(b) Fluvial and Maritime Law. By the Versailles Treaty (Article
346) the European Commission of the Danube was reconstituted and an
advisory opinion,80 rendered on request of Rumania and three other
powers, gave the Permanent Court an opportunity, not merely to confirm the commission's jurisdiction extending over the "maritime sector"
of that important stream, but to render a valuable contribution to the
7Jl Id. at 369. As regards the gold standard of value "the question is not what the
parties actually foresaw or could foresee, but what means they selected for their protection" (id. at 366) the bonds having been authorized and issued in Serbia were
deemed governed by the law of that state, "as regards the substance of the debt," though
not as to the medium of payment (id. at 373). Cf. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,
3 World Ct. Rep. 148 at 170, 184, 215 (Ser. A/B, No. 53, 1933).
"A State is estopped from relying on the non-fulfillment of an international obligation on its part." LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY
THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 83 (1934).
76
Stauffenberg, ''What the World Court Has Done So Far," 7 TE.MPLE L. REv.
131 at 135 (1933).
77
In construing art. 3, par. 2 of the Treaty of Lausanne relative to the frontier
between Iraq and Turkey, l World Ct. Rep. 720 at 742-743 (Ser. B, No. 12, 1923)
the Court made an important application of the maxim that "no one may be a judge in
his own suit," holding that the unanimity required by art. V of the government for
decisions by the League of Nations Council would be attained without representatives
of the litigant parties.
" ••• The Treaty was silent on the matter except inasmuch as it entrusted the
Council with the task of laying down the frontier, which task the Court conceived as
intimating that the Council's decision must be effective and not liable to stultification
by the vote of one of the parties • • • it would be difficult to find a decision of the
Court which is more important from the point of view either of theory or of its practical consequences," LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY
THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 48-49 (1934).
78
Jaworzina case, 1 World Ct. Rep. 253 (Ser. B, No. 8, 1923).
79
The decision was subjected however to modifications made some ten months
later.
so 2 World Ct. Rep. 140 (Ser. B, No. 14, 1927).
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history of navigation rights on international rivers, which "prior to
I 8 I 5, ... was not regulated by any general principle ... and formed a
subject of constant dispute." 81 Two years later the Court construed another article (33 I) of the same treaty, declaring five European rivers
international, and confirmed the jurisdiction over one ( the Oder) as extending to sections of Polish territory. 82 Under ·other; decisions "the
Meuse is an international river" 83 and the Kiel Canal "has become an
international waterway." 84 An important decision 85 as to liability for
collisions on the high seas was rendered, the president casting the deciding vote. Use of the Danzig port facilities for Polish war ships was
denied. 86
(c) International Economic and Financial Law (Droit ]1iscal International). This is one of the new international law branches of which
81

Id. at 164 et seq.
"In order to answer the principal question . . • how far the powers of the • • •
Commission extended, the Court had first to ascertain the meaning of the •.• Statute of
the Danube referring to the status quo ante. It had been concluded that the clause was
framed so as to perpetuate the divergence of views •.• between the states represented
on the .•. Commission. But the Court did not accept this contention because it would _
amount to the continuance over the Danube system of the uncertain and precarious
situation. It took the view that the clause referred to the conditions which existed •••
before the [first] World War in the contested sector, and that its effect was to maintain
and confirm the!!e conditions. Since Rumania had accepted the Statute she had equally
accepted the exercise of powers by the. Commission in the contested sector, if such
powers were in fact exercised before the War. The Court therefore proceeded to examine the pre-war situation, and after having ascertained that the ... Commission had
in fact exercised its powers in the Galatz-Braila sector, it answered the question in the
affirmative." Stauffenberg, "What Has the World Court Done So Far," 7 TEMPLE
L. R.Ev. 131 at 154 (1933).
82
Oder Commission's Jurisdiction, 2 World Ct. Rep. 609 at 631 (Ser. A, No. 23,
1929).
The Court found it necessary to "go back to the principles governing international
fl.uvial law in general and consider what position was adopted by the Treaty of Versailles" (id. at 62 7) and that "the interest of all states is in liberty of navigation in both
directions (up and down stream)." Id. at 628.
83
Meuse Water Diversion, 4 World Ct. Rep. 172 at 183 (Ser. A/B, No. 70,
1937).
84
S.S. Wimbledon, 1 World Ct. Rep. 163 at 173 (Ser. A, No. 1, 1923).
85
S. S. Lotus, 2 World Ct. Rep. 20 (Ser. A, No. 10, 1927). The questipn was
whether Turkey acted contrary to international law while instituting criminal proceedings against the officer of a French vessel which, colliding with a Turkish vessel, caused
the death of eight Turkish nationals. The Court said "that offences, the authors of
which at the moment of commission are in the territory [ vessel in this case] of another
state, are nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed in the national territory,
if one of the constituent elements of the offence, and more especially the effects, have
taken place there" (id. at 38). Regina v. Keyn L. R.'Il Ex. Div. 63 (1877) was distinguished and attention called to "mor~ recent English decisions" in which its doctrine "has been abandoned." (Id. at 43-44.)
86
Use of Danzig Port, 2 World Ct. Rep. 762 (Ser. A/B, No. 43, 1931).
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the Permanent Court has been laying the foundation. 87 "The usual
object of a commercial convention," it has said,88 "is to give each of the
parties facilities for trade and navigation in the other's territories."
Hence in construing the Saint-Germain convention the court declared
the commercial equality thereby required "in itself presupposes in principle freedom of trade," with "the right-in principle unrestricted-to
engage in any commercial activity" whether trade or industry, which
latter was held to include the transportation business. 89 But free use of
another country's waterways and port facilities for "imports and exports" would not of itself include such use by war ships 90 and a proposed customs union between a powerful state and a weak one, giving
special privileges to the former, was held to infringe a treaty by which
the latter undertook neither to alienate nor to compromise its independence.91 But the World War did not release a debtor state.92

(S) Procedural Contributions
"I marvel at the simplicity, the directness, and on the whole, the
expedition, of the procedure worked out at The Hague ... I am aware
87 "In accordance with the practice established by Lippert [Htmdworterbuch, des
Volkeffechts (Berlin, 1929) III, 834] and Harms [id. 503], international economic
and financial law is here understood to include all the topics relating to cases in which
there is, on the one hand, a predominantly economic or financial element, and on the
other a foreign or international element." Schwarzenberger, "The Development of
International and Financial Law by the Permanent Court of International Justice,"
54 JuRID. REv. 21 at 24 (1942).
" ••. Much attention is being given now to a more intelligent direction of future
international investment, and proposals are under consideration for a central agency,
possibly connected with a world bank, to supervise the purposes, terms and security of
loans moving across national boundaries. Hitherto, the writing on this subject has had
little or nothing to say about the changes and developments of international ••. law
concerning the rights and duties of lenders and borrowers that must accompany such an
innovation if it is to have any chance of success." Corbett, "World Order-An Agenda
for Lawyers," 37 AM. J. INT. L. 207 at 209 (1943). See also W. E. Beckett, "International Law in England," 55 LAW Q. REv. 257 (1939).
88
Eastern Greenland Case, 3 World Ct. Rep. 151 at 176 (Ser. A/B, No. 53,
1933) which " . . . dealt with issues of economic importance to Denmark and Norway • • . [whose] action • • • is a clear milestone on that road • • . [ toward the pacific
settlement of disputes] •.• the World Court .•. has lived up to the high hopes entertained for its usefnlness." Hudson, "An Important Judgment of the World Court,"
19 A.B.A.J. 423 at 425 (1933).
89
Oscar Chinn Case, 3 World Ct. Rep. 416 at 435 (Ser. A/B, No. 63, 1934).
90 Polish Warships in Danzig, 2 World Ct. Rep. 763 (Ser. A/B, No. 43, 1931).
Cf. dissenting opinions in the Wimbledon Case, 1 World Ct. Rep. 163 at 182 (Ser. A,
No. 1, 1923).
.
91 Austro-German Zollverein, 2 World Ct. Rep. 711 (Ser. A/B, No. 41, 1931).
See also Its Adoisory Opinions, infra II, 5, a, at 858.
92
The Serbian Loans, 2 World Ct. Rep. 340 at 370 (Ser. A, No. 20, 1929).
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of no case in which any state has objected to the procedure.'; 98 Its contributions to this field include:
(a) Conciliation. "· .. it is for the Court to facilitate so far as is
compatible with the Statute ... direct and friendly settlement" to which
"judicial settlement ... is simply an alternative." 94
(b) Parties. Under Article 34 of the statute "only states or members of the League of Nations can be parties before the Court." But,
as construed by the latter, this does not prevent private individuals from
acquiring, under international agreement,-rights which the Court will
enforce in their behalf_when represented by their governments.90 Inter93
President Henderson of the American Bar Association in an address before the
Inter-American Bar Association at Mexico City, August, 1944, 30 A.B.A.J. 439 at 440
(1944).
94 Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 2 World Ct. Rep. 454 at
460 (Ser. A, No. 22, 1929).
The Court declined a proposal by the parties to render a partial decision before
allowing "a reasonable time to settle." The parties (France and Switzerland) were
given until May 1, 1930 to effect an agreement.
"It has indicated .•• that the order entered for voluntary adjustment is to be
deemed exceptional. It would seem necessary and proper, however, for the Court to
have such power as part of its function of determining disputes under voluntary submissions. Such power would not extend its jurisdiction. It would serve to develop its
usefulness as a court of conciliation where the conciliatory process is needed to supplement determination of justiciable issues." A. K. Kuhn, 24 AM. J. INT. L. 350 at
353 (1930).
"Compulsory jurisdiction of an international court does not exclude a procedure
of conciliation. When the parties agree, the conflict may first be submitted to a commission of conciliation. Then the court becomes competent only in the event of failure of
conciliation. This is provided by Art. 20 of. the General Act of the Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes of 1928."\ Kelsen, "Compulsory Adjudication of International
Disputes," 37 AM. J. INT. L. 397 at 405 (1943).
95
Jurisdiction of Danzig Courts, 1 World Ct. Rep. 236 at 246-247 (Ser. B, No. 15,
1928).
"It is difficult to exaggerate the bearing of the Court's Opinion on the ~ubject under
discussion. The acquisition of treaty rights directly by individuals is made a consequence
of the intention of the parties. The view that they can acquire rights only through
the instrumentality of the municipal law of States, is rejected. The postulated insurmountable barrier between the individual and international law is ignored. The exclusiveness of States as beneficiaries of international rights, is denied. Had the Court
wished to adhere to the traditional doctrine, it would have interpreted the controversial
intention of the parties in the light of that doctrine. This it refused to do. Moreover,
the departure from the established view was effected with such ingenious restraint that
some have been led to believe that the decision ..• amounts to a solemn affirmation of
the established doctrine. Henceforth, whenever a similar case arises--at least before the
Permanent Court-it will no longer be possible to appeal, with any chance of success, to
the alleged impossibility of individuals acquiring directly rights under a treaty. All will
depend on the intention of the parties." LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PERMANENT CouRT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 52
(1934).
"Nevertheless, as was proved by the great number of cases decided by the Court

1945}

WoRLDCouRT

vention is allowed a state having an interest in the controversy or which
is a party to a convention involved therein.96
(c) Remedies. Relief in the nature of an injunction has been
sought from the Court on several occasions. In one it was found unnecessary to "deal with the question whether such a prohibition, although customary in contracts between individuals, might form the
subject of an injunction to a government even ... of working, as a state
enterprise, the factory of which export was to be limited."97 In another
case an injunction was denied upon the merits.98
( d) Pleadings. Proceedings are instituted either by ~"special agreement" (stipulation) 99 or by a written application ( requete) .100 The adverse party may file "a preliminary objection" 101 and, if it is overruled,
a counter-claim.102 The official language is "French or English." 108
falling into the category of international economic and financial law, •.. the fact that
individuals had no direct access to the Court only meant that formally such vested
interests had to shelter behind the authority of the entities from which the locus standi
cannot be withheld. On the other hand, the likelihood that an enterprise can induce its
government to take up its case is probably not unconnected with its economic, financial,
and social impact, and this situation therefore creates a certain inequality in the sphere
of economic and financial law which is here, as elsewhere, hardly compatible with the
conception of law in the Western sense." Schwarzenberger, ''The Development of
International Economic and Financial Law by the Permanent Court of International
Justice," 54 JuRID. REv. 21 at 26, 27 (1942).
The Central American Court allowed individual claims to be presented, 19 lowA
L. REv. 190 (1934); and the Inter-American Bar Association (Rio de Janeiro, Aug.
1943) recommended that the World Court be made "accessible .•• to individuals when
their fundamental rights have been violated by states." See 37 AM. J. INT. L. 669

(1943) ·

96
Statute, arts. 58, 59, 63; HUDSON, PERMANENT CouRT OF INTERNATIONAL
JusTICE (1943) at p. 207-208. Reference is made to Hudson's work last citeg., hereafter cited as HUDSON, this note, for citations to the Statute establishing the World Court
and also for the 1936 rules of the court. S.S. Wimbledon, l World Ct. Rep. 166 (Ser.
A, No. 1, 1923). Under Rule 64 (1936), HUDSON 749, an application (requete) is
necessary upon which a hearing is held.
97
Chorzow Factory, 1 World Ct. Rep. 646 at 686 (Ser. A, No. 17, 1928).
98
Meuse Diversion Case, 4 World Ct. Rep. 172 at 202 (Ser. A, No. 81, 1937).
99
See example in 2 World Ct. Rep. 451.
100
Statute, art. 40 HUDSON, supra note 96 at p. 197; Rules 32 et seq. (1936),
HUDSON 740. A copy is transmitted to the adverse party, members of the Court and
of the League of Nations. Examples of application appear in 2 World Ct. Rep. 4, 5,
94 and 269; 1 World Ct. Rep. 164-165, 294, 478, 509, 578, 619.
101
Rule 62 (1936) HUDSON, supra note 96 at p. 748. E. g., to the Court's jurisdiction.
102
Rule 63 (1936) HuDSON, supra note 96 at p. 749. It must be "directly connected with the subject of the application." This was availed of by the Belgian government in the Meuse case, 4 World Ct. Rep. 172, 180, 188 (Ser. A/B, No. 70, 1937);
but its "counter-memorial" was rejected (p. 202). The "memorials" and "countermemorials" (briefs) appear to supplement the pleadings (Rules 41, 42).
103
Rule 39 (1936) HUDSON, supra note 96 at p. 721.
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( e) Pro~f may be oral or documentary.104 Witnesses "declare ...
on honor and conscience" and are examined by "agents, counsel or advocates" or by the judges.10~ The onus probandi rule has been applied 106 and presumptions are indulged; 101 a land register entry was
treated as sufficient to establish title to land 108 and documents produced
held sufficient to show legal personality.100 The Court has judicially
noticed historical facts 110 and rejected a contention of a party for want
of evidence.111
Exclusion. A self serving document in the nature of a brief was
excluded "at the present stage of the case." 112 and the Court h~ declined to consider travaux preparatoires-"p_reparatory work" 118 con104

Statute, art. 43 HuDsoN, supra note 96 at p. 199; 3 World Ct. Rep. 322
(Ser. A/B, No. 61, 1933).
105
Rule 53 (1936) HUDSON, supra note 96 at p. 724. The Court may call upon
the state to summon witnesses therefrom. Statute, art. 44 HUDSON 200.
106
" • • • It is for the Respondent to prove that the concessions are not valid."
Mavroi:nmattis Palestine Concessions, I World Ct. Rep. 355 at 373 (Ser. A, No. 5,
1925). Cf. European Danube Commission, 2 World Ct. Rep. 138 at 221 (Ser. B,
No. 14, 1927).
101
2 World Ct. Rep. 268 at 291 (Ser. A, No. 15, 1928); id. 402 at 432 (Ser. A,
Nos. 20-21, 1929).
108
German interests in Upper Silesia, 1 World Ct. ,Rep. 510 at 540 (Ser. A,
No. 7, 1926).
109
Peter Pazmany University, 3 World Ct.'Rep. 3n (Ser. A/B, No. 61, 1933).
110
Brazilian loans, 2 World Ct. Rep. 402 at 428 (Ser. A, Nos. 20-21, 1929). But
the Court "is not obliged .•• to know the municipal [internal] law of the various
countries." Polish War Vessels in Danzig, 2 World Ct. Rep. 763 at 775 (Ser. A/B,

No. 43, 1931).
111

Meuse Diversion case, 4 World Ct. Rep. 178 at 200 (Ser. A/B, No. 70,
1937). Cf. 4 id. 432 where a similar failure of the same government was mentioned
as follows in a dissenting opinion: " •.• the Belgian Agent definitely offered to produce
proof, but left the Court to decide whether he should •.. it seems difficult to draw any
conclusion detrimental to Belgiu~ from the non-presentation••.•"
112
Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 2 World Ct. Rep. 448 at
460, 466 (Ser. A, No. 22, 1939).
113
·
S.S. Lotus, 2 World Ct. Rep. 20 at 33 (Ser. A, No. 10, 1927). Cf. 2 World
Ct. Rep. 159; 4 id. 241 at 264-265; id. 286 at 292-293, 296; id. 388 at 439, 447;
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PERMANENT
CouRT OF INTERNATIONAL JusTICE 35-40 (1934). What a contrary ruling might lead
to is well illustrated in Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 at 520, 44 S. Ct.
412 (1924) where "The opinion [by Brandeis, J.] contains dozens of references to
books, articles, reports of committees, testimony before congressional committees, reports
of state and municipal officers and agencies, federal administrative regulations, regulations adopted by the Conference on Weights and Measures, a I 91 7 letter from Herbert
Hoover to President Wilson, results of an investigation by the Bureau of Chemistry, and
many other similar references, with frequent quotations of statements, .findings, opinions,
beliefs, and points of view-all in utter disregard of any rules of. evidence that would
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sisting usually of documents exchanged or otherwise used by the parties litigant before the case was actually instituted.
Production of proof is governed by liberal and elastic rules.114
View. In one case 115 resort was had to the practice sometimes provided for juries, of an ocular inspection of the scene involved in the
controversy.
(£) Judgments are subject to strict requirements as to their contents 116 and are usually elaborate, fortified by authority and well reasoned. However, dissenting opinions are frequent. Provision is also
made for revising or interpreting judgments upon application; 117 but
they are not subject to appeal.118 "There can be no doubt as to the
competence of the Court to render declaratory judgments," observed
Judge Hudson.119 In faet, it had already done so.120
control adjudicative facts." Davis, "An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process," 55 HARV. L. REv. 364 at 404 (1942).
But in Borden's Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 at 210, 55 S. Ct. 187 (1934),
Chief Justice Hughes said:
" ••• where the legislative action is suitably challenged, and a rational basis for it is
predicated upon the particular economic facts ·of a given trade or industry, which are
outside the sphere of judicial notice, these facts are properly the subject of evidence and
of findings." The case was remanded to develop the legislative facts.
And in Morgan v. United States 298 U.S. 468• at 480, 56 S. Ct. 906 (1936),
the same judge observed: "Nothing can be treated as evidence which is not introduced
as such." See also United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274 at 288,
44 S. Ct. 565 (1923); Atcheson, Topeka & S. F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S.
248 at 252, 52 S. Ct. 146 (1932); I. C. C. v. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88 at 93,
33 S. Ct. 185 (1913).
114
". • • The court is not tied to any system of taking evidence . • • its task is to
cooperate in the objective ascertainment of the truth" and it "cannot omit to use any
means which may enable it to ascertain the objective • • . the Statute [art. 50] provides that the Court shall take active steps and. not adopt a passive attitude." Van
Eysinga, C. in the Oscar Chinn case, 3 World Ct. Rep. 416 at 479 (Ser. A/B, No. 63,
1934).
" ... The Court does not say that there is an absolute rule that the request for an
advisory opinion may not involve some enquiry as to the facts, but, under ordinary
circumstances, it is certainly expedient that the facts upon which •.. [its] opinion ••.
is desired should not be in controversy, and ••. should not be left to the Court itself to
ascertain ...•" Eastern Carelia case, I World Ct. Rep. 190 at 205 (Ser. B, No. 5,
1923).
115
Meuse Diversion case, 4 World Ct. Rep. 177-8 (Ser. C, No. 81, 1937). Three
days were consumed in the inspection.
16
~
Rule 74 (1936), HUDSON, supra note 96 at p. 732.
117
Rnles 78-81, incl. (1936), HuDsoN, supra note 96 at p. 753-754.
118
Statute, art. 60, HUDSON, supra note 96 at p. 298.
119
Meuse Diversion case, 4 World Ct. Rep. 172 at 233-234 (Ser. A/B, No. 70,
1937).
120
Treaty of Neuilly Interpretation, 1 World Ct. Rep. 410 at 414 (Ser. A, No. 3,
1924). German Interests in Polish Silesia, 1 id. 475 (Ser. A, No. 7, 1926), where
the Court said: "There seems to be no reason why States should not .•. ask the Court
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Damages. The Court has also blazed a new path of international
law in the measure of damages, which, it holds,121 "must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not
been committed." Here we find, doubtless for the first time in the international law field, the rule of consequential damages instead of
merely those resulting directly.
Its "Optional Clause'' has been Accepted by the Great Majority
of Sovereign States
According to Judge Hudson,122 no less than fifty-six sovereign states
have at some time accepted the "optional clause,m23 though many have
done so with reservations.124 Nordon 125 claims that "the optional
clause ... deprived it ( the Court) of all value for the purpose under
discussion": but the clause will cease to be "optional" whenever the
few remaining sovereignties, including the United States have accepted
it. Surely it should be easier to persuade these few, in the light of current events, than to induce the nearly sixty others to ratify a new pact.126
2.

to give an abstract interpretation of a treaty; rather would it appear .•• one of ..•
[its] most important functions."
"The Court's Judgment No,. 7 [referring to the preceding case] is in the nature of
a declaratory judgment, the intention of which is to ensure recognition of a situation
at law, once and for all and with binding force as between the Parties; so that the
legal position thus established cannot again be called in question ..••" Chorzow Factory,
I World Ct. Rep. 624 at 636 (Ser. A, No. 13, 1927). See 2 id. 708 (Ser. A/B, No.
40, 1931); 3 id. 292 at 303 (Ser. A/B, No. 58, 1933).
.
121
See I id. 624 at 677-678 (Ser. A, No. 17, 1928). But cf. Oscar Chinn case,
3 id. 416 at 438-439 (Ser. C, No. 75, 1934).
In Greece v. Bulgaria, 1 World Ct. Rep. 409 (Ser. A, No. 3, 1924) the Court
interpreted a clause in the Neuilly Treaty as providing indemnity even for acts committed outside Bulgarian territory; but later refused an interpretation of the judgement
on the ground that its limits could not be exceeded.
122
THE PERMANENT CouRT OF INTERNATIONAL JusTICE 681-705 (1943) .• See
also his article on "The Obligatory Jurisdiction of the Permanent Court," 19 lowA L.
REv. 190 (1934).
123
This clause provides for a "declaration of acceptance" of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. See Hepburn, "The Optional Clause," 19 GEORGETOWN L. J. 66
(1930).
124 E.g., those of the British Commonwealth reserve disputes with each other.
The others include Chile, Cuba, Equador, Honduras, Japan and Mexico-7mrely not an
imposing list.
125
NORDON, THE WORLD COURT FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND SAFETY 31
(1939).
126
"As for obligatory jurisdiction, there is some ground for hope in the fact that
more than forty States adhered to the optional clause in the statute of the Permanent
Court. • . . The most essential condition of our reaching such a point again-to say
nothing of going beyond it to universal obligatory jurisdiction-is, however, the agreement of the United States. To accept the jurisdiction ••• with the reservation that a
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3. It Has an Equipment and Machinery _which it would Require
Many Years and Intense Effort to Duplicate; MeafllWhile Needs
would be Pressing and Opportunities Lost
A World Court is necessarily an institution of slow growth. Its successful operation requires much careful planning and utilizing the
lessons of experience. The Permanent Court has passed its formative
stage and attained prestige and position which not even the United
States Supreme Court had reached in the same period. Must all these
results be discarded and its wealth of jurisprudence discredited121
merely to provide room for a new experiment? In the fateful years
which are sure to follow the present struggle, the world will need a
seasoned institution-not a novice. The twenty years of the Permanent
Court have prepared it to meet and solve the very problems which will
confront the post-war world.
And not the least important feature of its equipment is the imposing
structure,_128 provided by an American philanthropist, at an historic and
strategic site, which was its home until it was forced to flee from a ruthless invader. That structure could not be moved nor, except at great
cost, duplicated.
4. Future Possibilities
a. The Molder of an International Law System
After reviewing the contributions of the Permanent Court to international law, which necessarily have been fragmentary as yet, one is
naturally led to hope that it may be the instrument for creating a real
international law system-something which has not yet appeared. For
it is the judicial, rather than the legislative, bodies• which have created
other legal systems.129 Thus, at Rome it was the jurisconsults by whose
compromis requiring the consent of two-thirds of the Senate must procede the submis-sion of any dispute, would not confer obligatory jurisdiction." Corbett, "World Order
-An Agenda for Lawyers," 37 AM J. INT. L. 207 at 216 (1943).
127
Of course the decisions of a defunct court, regardless of their soundness would
not have the weight or prestige of those rendered by a "going concern." -·
128
The writer will never forget the impressive scene in the hearing room of the
World Court Building at the Hague when the delegates to the Comparative Law Congress of I 93 7 were invited to attend a session at which the Court delivered one of its
most important judgments.
129
"It is not generally recognized on the continent, even today, that these new
courts made new law." MUNROE SMITH, A GENERAL Vrnw OF EUROPEAN LEGAL HisTORY 309 (1927).
" .•. The history of Roman and Anglo-American law shows how judicial decisions
create law. A famous American jurist said, 'All the law is judge-made law.'" Kelsen,
"Compulsory Adjudication of International Disputes," 37 AM. J. INT. L. 397 at 401
(1943). See Secretary of State Stimson's letter of Nov. 18, 192g to President Hoover,
requesting authorization to sign protocal, Senate Ex. Doc. I, 72d Cong., 1st sess., p. 128.
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"decisions," reached in the imperial council, the law of the empire was
chiefly developed.180 So in England,1 81 said the late and eminent Holdsworth,132 "we must look to the rules of the King's Court for the foundations of the common law." Again, the development by the court of
chancery and the chancellors, both in England and America, of the
system known as "equity," is a familiar chapter to the lawyers of both
countries, while "British Prize Law is formed by a body of prece-'
dents." 183 · Today another distinct branch-administrative law, has been
growing rapidly and, at least in France, under the guiding hand of the
Conseil d'etat, has been developing into a system.134 No good reason is
apparent why international law, which is yet little more than a mass of
heterogeneous and often disputed doctrines, may n0t be molded by this
World Court into a scientific system, comparable to those above men- ·
tioned, all of which are the products of the courts which have administered them.185
MUNROE SMITH, A GENERAL VIEW OF EUROPEAN LEGAL .HISTORY 304-305
adding: "The great jurists of the second and third centuries were judges in the
modern sense . • • their decisions were reported and digested in their writings. .Their
commentaries were, for the most part, digests of case law; their books of 'questions' and
'responses' were, as the names imply, collections of cases. . . . During the early empire
there was little direct legislation.",
·
181
"It is interesting to note that it was the courts which first appeared with
specialized functions in the history of English institutional development." Goodrich,
"The Nature of the Advisory Opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice," 32 AM. J. lNT. L. 738 at 757 (1938).
132
2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw I 92 ( I 93 2). It was through recognition by the King's Court that the local custom of a shire became part of the customary
law of the realm.
183
Kunz, "British Prize Cases, 1939-1941," 36 AM. J: INT. L. 204 at 205
(1942).
.
.
134 See Lobingier, "Administrative Law and Droit Administratif," 91 UNIV. PA.
L. REv. 36 at 58 (1942).
185
"A new body of international jurisprudence is gradually being accumulated. So
firmly fixed is the Court's position in the world's treaty law that its permanence now
seems assured." Hudson, '.'Permanent Court of International Justice," 12 ENCYC. Soc.
Sc. 78 at 81 (1934).
'
"The cumulation of case-law is important both because it emphasizes the element
of continuity ••. and because of the greater guidance offered by the Court's jurisprudence to persons confronted with problems of international law. Without exaggeration,
the cumulation may be said to point toward 'the harmonious development of the law'
which was a desideratum with the draftsmen of the Statute ••.•" HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 630 (1943).
" .•• There are rules which the Court has repeatedly applied, with the result that
there has established itself a kind of 'jurisprudence' in matters covered by them; ...
there are rules and principles which legal analysis may legitimately deduce from those
already applied by the Court. The result has been the development of an imposing
body of law which can be used not only as direct evidence of the rules of law as understood by the Court, but also as indicative of the method and the spirit in which the Court
lSO

( I 92 7),
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b. A Tribunal to Try Offenders Against the War Law of Nations
The Declaration of Moscow,186 after promising punishment under
local law for such offenders, adds that this "is without prejudice to the
case of German criminals whose offenses have no particular localization
and who will be punished by joint decision of the allied government..''
Of course, this involves a trial before a tribunal of some kind.181 For the
participants in the conference which resulted in that declaration must
have had in mind the abortive provision of the Versailles Treaty 188
from which the "Powers" allowed themselves to be outmaneuvered
by the crafty German leaders so that their Reichsgericht was substituted,
and conducted "trials" which proved farcical.189
Doctor Sheldon Glueck of Harvard, after considering the national
courts and military tribunals, both national and joint, presents ,a strong
argument 140 for a judicial trial under the auspices of the United Nacan be counted upon to approach similar cases." LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERN~TIONAL LAW BY THE PERMANENT CouRT OF INTERNATIONAL JusTicE 8-9
(1934).
186
See CORDELL HULL, THE Moscow CoNFERENCE, State Department Publication No. 2027 (1943). On Nov. 16, 1937, a "Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court" was signed by the representatives of thirteen states. For_
text see 7 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 878 (1941).
187
See e.g., the report of an American Bar Association Sub-Committee, 37 AM. J.
INT. L. 663 (1943); Finch, "Retribution for War Crimes," id. 81.
188
The Versailles Treaty with Germany provided that, "Persons guilty of criminal
acts against the nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought
before the military tribunals of that Power." Art. 229.
189
"Of an original list of some 900 persons accused of serious offenses only 45
were included in a 'test list' submitted by the Allies after. protracted argument on the
part of the Germans. Only l 2 were actually tried and but 6 convicted. They received inadequate sentences and the two whose sentences were severest soon escaped
from the German jails, apparently with official connivance." Glueck, "By What
Tribunal Shall War Offenders Be Tried?" 56 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1943) where he
adds in a note: "The Allied mission sent to 'observe' the Leipzig trials withdrew in protest at the outcome of the twelve cases mentioned above. Practically all the remaining
cases on the Allied list, as well as • . • [those] which came to the attention of the
Reichsgericlit ••• from persons within and outside the Reich, were disposed of by order
of the court discontinuing the proceedings, usually on the ground of 'insufficient evidence'," citing 3 MEURER, VoLKERRECHT IM WELTKRIEG 58 et seq. (1927).
But the commission which reported the original plan had also recommended an
international "high tribunal" for the trial of more _serious offenses against the allied
powers. Unfortunately the opposition of the Japanese and (strange to say) American,
delegations prevented the proposal's adoption. See 14 AM. J. INT. L. 95 at 146, 151,
143-144 (1920).
uo "Apart from technical theories, it does not seem unfair to hold a violator of the
laws and customs of war to account by direct application of the law of nations and by
means of an international tribunal V\'hich was not in being when he committed his offense. • • • Under the customary law of nations a belligerent may punish serious violators
of the laws of war by death; any lesser punishment that its domestic legislation may im-
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tions. The principal arguments against the proposal are those of ex post
facto and nulla poena sine lege; 141 but th(? former relates to the offense
and the latter to the penalty. Neither pertains to the tribunal. Moreover, "nullum crimen sine lege was never literally followed 142 ... as to
nulla poena sine lege ... there has been very considerable departure
from classical views." 143 Every word of Doctor Glueck's logical argument 144 of over thirty pages, would support a proposal to confer such
jurisdiction upon the Permanent Court. For here again, why create a
new tribunal when we have at hand a seasoned one upon which the
United Nations could more easily confer the desired jurisdiction than
to create a new one? The trend of expert opinion favors a tribunal with
several branches rather than separate courts.145

5. Objections to the Court
a. I ts Advisory Opinions
This is listed first, not because it is deemed the weightiest, but because it was the one most stressed by the opponents of the resolution of
adherence to the Court, when pending before the United States Senate.146 The original World Court Statute contained no mention of such
opinions, although the League of Nations Covenant (Article 14) had
authorized them. Articles 65 to 68, now appearing in the statute,
were added in order to meet such objections. Advisory opinions, long
used in England 147 have been authorized by the constitutions of eight

r

pose is therefore a matter of grace to the offender." Glueck, "By What Tribunal Shall
War Offenders Be Tried?" 56 HARV. L. REv. 1059 at 1084, 1086 (1943).
One advantage of the Permanent Court is that it is already "in being."
141 See Manner, "The Legal Nature and Punishment of Criminal Acts of Violence
Contrary to the Laws of War," 37 AM. J. INT. L. 407 (1943). This author quotes
Nielsen, negotiator in the United States-Turkey Claims Settlement, at 415, as having
"once criticized Oppenheim's description of penal offenses against the laws of war as
'war crimes' because the term ... suggests an offense against the law of nations." But
Oppenheim's description is amply sustained by the•Iogic of Glueck and of Hall, cited
infra note 142.
142
Jerome Hall, "Nulla Poena Sine Lege," 47 YALE L. J. 165 at 182-183
(1937), a thoroughly scientific discussion of the subject.
148 Ibid.
144 Glueck, "By What Tribunal Shall War Offenders Be Tried?" 56 HARV. L.
REV. 1059 (1943).
145 E.g., the English Hig!i Court of Justice.
146 A majority of the Foreign Relations Committee reported that it was "believed
.•. to be a highly dangerous (sic) and undesirable jurisdiction" to render advisory
opinions. S. Rep. No. 634 Cong., 1st sess., p. 3, March 27, 1924. Cf. Senate Ex.
Doc. 1, 72d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 69 et seq.; Hervey, "Advisory Opinions as an Obstacle
to Our Admission to the World Court," 6 TEMPLE L. REv. 15 (1931).
147 Veeder, "Advisory Opinions of the Judges of England," I 3 HARV. L. REv. 358
(1900).
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American states and have been rendered by the Supreme Courts of
seven others and of Hawaii.148 Whatever adverse comment may have
been offered meanwhile, it certainly can not be claimed that they are
unprecedented or "un-:American." 149 But they have a special rai-son
d!etre in the international fi.eld.uo
An advisory opinion 151 which occasioned such discussion at the time
of its rendition involved two questions: (I) whether the ''Vienna Protocol" of the St. Germain Treaty would ipso facto alienate Austrian independence ( which the Court unanimously resolved in the negative)
and ( 2) whether it was "calculated directly or indirectly to compromise" that independence. On the latter question the Court divided,
eight to seven, the majority (including the French judge who wrote
the opinion and Italian, Spanish, Polish, Rumanian, Colombian, Cuban
and Salvadorian judges) holding in the affirmative. The Italian judge
(Anzilotti) in a separate, concurring opinion, pointed out "the movement already under way in Germany and Austria for political union."
His words were almost prophetic, for it was only six and a half years
later that Hitler's hordes entered Vienna as conquerors. 1t is in the
light of history, both prior and subsequent, that the opinion must be
148
See Frankfurter, "Advisory Opinions," l ENcYc. Soc. Sc. 475 at 476 (1930);
ELLINGWOOD, DEPARTMENTAL CooPERATION IN STATE GoVERNMENT (1918); Lobingier, "Constitutional Law;' 6 AM. & ENG, ENcYc. OF LAw, 2d ed., 882 at 10651079.
149
"Anglo-American Legal History would hardly bear out the conception that
courts of justice can only act in controverted case," Hudson, "Advisory Opinions in
National and International Courts," 37 HARV. L. REv. 970 at 990 (1924).
Probably one reason why the practice has not extended farther is the growing tendency of state and federal attorneys to write and publish opinions in respqnse to official
inquiry,
iso "This type of jurisdiction has its greatest justification in the field of international law, which is based largely upon the construction of treaties and where it is in the
interest of peace that cases shall be moot and that rights be determined in advance of an
actual violation which may result in an inflamed national feeling and possibly war, It is
not, therefore, surprising that the League regards its right to ask the Court for advisory
opinions as an important element in the Pacific settlement of actual disputes and as
a powerful means of avoiding threatened invasions of national prerogatives." Bok, ''The
United States and the World Court The Austro-German Customs Union Case," So
UNIV. PA, L. REv. 335 at 337 (1932).
" ••• The advisory opinion is useful as a means of bringing before the Court ques-e
tions involving the interpretation of such constitutional documents as the Covenant of
the League or the Constitution of the International Labor Organization. Here questions
of law are involved which might be difficult to get before a court in any qther way."
Chamberlain, Book Review of HuDsoN, THE PERMANENT CouRT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE, 37 AM, J. INT. L. 694 at 695 (1943).
See also Goodrich, ''The Nature of the Advisory Opinions of the Permanent Court
of International Justice," 32 AM. J. INT. L. 738 at 755-756 (1938).
161
Austro-German Zollverien, 2 World Ct, Rep, 7II (Ser, A/B, No. 41, 1931),
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appraised and when it is,. the criticism152 which has appeared in some
quarters, will be found untenable.
The situation out of which this case arose no longer exists and may
never recur; but the two prevailing opinions indicate how, through this
much criticized practice, the Court is enabled to give a realistic interpretation to treaties and thus promote the "maintenance of international ...
order." 163 Had its warning been heeded and had the allied powers
combined to enforce observance of the treaty, Austria would not have
been crushed and World War II might have been averted.

b. Its National Judges
The late Pierre Crabites 154 declared the Permanent Court not a judicial body 155 because article 3 I of the statute provides for "judges of the
152
"There is hardly a decision of the Court which has been exposed to more
severe criticism. In so far as this criticism is j usti.fied, it is so not because of the nature
of the conclusion reached •• -. or, even less so, because it agreed to give an opinion on a
matter involving the consideration of future political contingencies; but because of the
absence of any concrete intimation of the reasons underlying the Opinion. The highly
political nature of the 'controversy served to emphasize the fact that there may be
cases in which the failure to give reasons may constitute a grave disservice to the cause
of international justice." LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW BY THE PERMANENT CouRT OF INTERNATIONAL JusTicE 20-21 (1934).
But the "criticism" here mentioned has not been shared by the best professional
sentiment in this country; on the contrary it has been confined mostly to isolationists.
As typical of the contrary sentiment the following may be noted:
"The advisory opinion ••. by the World Court on September 5, 1931, was not a
political decision. It involved the determination of a legal question, i:e., whether there
was a conflict between certain contractual obligations ••• of Austria.
There was no doubt of a conflict in the minds of a majority of the Court. Austria
and Germany abandoned the proposed customs union two days before the Court's
opinion was made public~ •••" Hervey, "Advisory Opinions as an Obstacle to Our
Admission to the World Court," 6 TEMPLE L. REv. 15 at 25 (1931).
"All this po~er over advisory opinions is the last obstacle in the way of full American recognition of this great Court which largely is the product of the genius of our own
statesmen, 'and the fulfillment of recommendations made by seven Presidents and five
Secretaries of State.•••" Wickersham, "The World Court and the Senate Reservations," l GEo. WASH. L. REv. 3 at 16 (1932).
Cf. Findelstein, "The World Court and theAnschluss," 6 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 209
(1932); 48 L. Q. REv. l (1932); Mathews, "Judicial Attitudes in the CustomsUnion Case," 30 MrcH. L. REv. 699 (1932).
153 "The Court was dealing with the question which was both legal and political.
It was given three texts to interpret; it was called upon to say whether a certain course
of action might compromise, or 'was calculated to threaten' the independence of Austria.
It would not be surprising to have a difference of opinion on that question even among
Judges who held exactly the same philosophy of law." Hudson, "The World Court
and Austro-German Customs Regime," 17 A.B.A.J. 791 at 793 (1931).
154 "The World Court Not a Judicial Body," 9 CAN. BAR REV. II7 (1931).
155 On the other hand, Gordon Ireland, who taught for a time at the same law
school as Judge Crabites, pronounced it "a true Court of Justice and not an Arbitration
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nationality of each contesting party" to sit with the others. Lauterpacht m also feared a tendency on their part to file dissenting opinions,
which has proved not to be the case. m The Committee of Jurists which
drafted the statute, deliberated at length on the question but finally reported that "it is highly desirable that the judges be able, up to the last
minute, during deliberations, to present and explain the statements and
arguments of the states and to insure that the sentence, however painful, in substance, should be so phrased as to avoid wounding national
susceptibilities .... If both opposing views are represented on the bench,
they counter-balance each other."m
c. I ts Lack of Sanctions

( r) Not a weighty objection. "Courts have existed with an elaborate constitution and procedure and no compulsory powers whatever." 159
Moreover, "seldom has a State refused to execute the decision of a court
which it has recognized in a treaty." 160 The United States Supreme
Court, nearly a half century after its establishment, found itself unable
to enforce a writ of habeas corpus granted a prisoner sentenced by a
state court for "residing within the limits of the Cherokee reservation." 161 Nearly a generation later the Court declared itself without a
Tribunal." Ireland, "The Juridical Nature of the Orders of the Permanent Court of
International Justice," 12 TULANE L. REv. 328 at 329 (1938).
166 Lauterpacht, "The Absence of an International Legislature and the Compulsory Jurisdiction of International Tribunals," I I B.Y.B. INT. L. 134 ( I 930).
157
Professor Hill found "only one advisory opinion rendered since Sept. 7, 1927,
to which a national judge had dissented," and two judgments before it "in which dissenting opinions were written by the national judges" while "frequently it has happened
that dissenting opinions of national judges have accompanied those of other judges,"
Hill, "National Judges in the Permanent Court of International Justice," 25 AM. J.
INT, L. 670 at 681-682 (1931).
158
Proces-Verbaux of the Committee's Proceedings 721. .
Professor Hill also concluded that "the actual operation of the system indicates that
the work of the court has not been hampered by the participation of judges representing litigant states," and that "it is probable that national judges have contributed positively to the achievement of the court through their representation of the legal systems
of states in dispute, and that by their effort they have increased the confidence of nations in the tribunal." Hill, "National Judges in the Permanent Court of International
Justice," 25 AM. J. INT. L. 670 at 683 (1931).
159 Sir Frederick Pollock, "The Sources of International Law," 2 CoL. L. REv.
511 at 514-515 (1902), adding by way of illustration, "This is the state .•• which
we read of as prevailing in Iceland, not much before the Norman conquest.•.. It is not
universally true that even the highest courts can always enforce their judgments."
160 LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (1934); HUDSON, THE PERMANENT
CouRT OF INTERNATIONAL JusTicE 267 (1943); WARREN, THE SuPREME CouRT
AND SOVEREIGN STATES 38 (1924).
161
Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 515 (1832). " . . . there was no
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sanction to enforce the constitutional mandate (IV, 2) for extradition.162
- But no one has yet proposed to abolish the Court because of its lack of
sanction in such cases.
(2) How Sanctions May Be Supplied. The lack of adequate sanctio-9s has long been urged against international law as a whole and if
available against the Permanent Court would be equally so, not only
against all similar tribunals but against the entire system which they
administer. The Pan-American publicists have been working on the
subject for some years and the second Foreign Ministers' Meeting
(Habana, I 940) approved 163 the "consultation procedure" m and
recommended a "vigilance committee" (in the term's best sense) for
inter-American controversies. At its third meeting (Rio de Janeiro,
r 942) the same body adopted a positive declaration as to the sanctity of
treaties.165 Meanwhile, the boycott had been considered as a form of
sanction 166 and the League of Nations attempted thereby to frustrate
Mussolini's unprovoked attack on Ethiopia; but fell just short of success. At the outbreak of World War II, United States policy shifted to
economic sanctions which proved more effective than is generally realized.167
. A .legacy from th~ late Dean Wigmore 168 proposes "an organized
boycott by a dominant group of states" financed by a system of insurance, which, Kocourek believes is "entirely new" and which, "if it
should happen to be adopted and succeeds in actual practice ~ .. will be
rated as one of the most important contributions to the welfare of the
human race." An international police force is one of the most frequently
method by which the Court could enforce its mandate." WARREN, THE SUPREME
CouRTIN AMERICAN H1sTORY_764 (1935).162 Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. (65 U.S.) 66 (1861). ·Notwithstanding the
mandatory language of this provision (which had been carried forward from the Articles
of Confederation) Chief Justice Taney concluded at p. 109-1 IO that, " •.• if the
Governor of Ohio refuses to discharge this duty, there is no power delegated to the
General Government, either through the Judicial Department or any other ••. to use
any coercive means to compel him"; and the clause in question has remained inoperative ever since.
163 With reiervations by Colombia's representatives.
164 Rowe, "The Habana Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
American Republics," 74 Pan American Union Bulletin 609 (1940).
,165 See 36 AM. J. INT. L. (Supp. No. 2) 82-83.
166 See id. 59 at 70 (1942); Potter, "The Wal Wal Arbitration," 30 id. 27 at
34 (1936); id. 175; Stewart, "Canada and International Labor Conventions/' 32 id.
34 (193'8); Kuhn, "The Economic Sanctions and the Kellogg Pact" 30 id. 83 (1936).
167 See Williams, "The Coming of Economic Sanctions into American Practice,"
37 id. 386 ( 1943).
168 "Bullets or Boycotts," edited by Albert Kocourek and published posthumously
in 29 A.B.A.J. 491 at 491 (1943).
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mentioned sanctions for maintaining peace and could be used equally
to enforce the Court's judgments; but, to be effective, it would require
an international organization.169

d. Its Connection with the League of Nations
Former Senator Dill's jibe that the Permanent Court is "not a
World Court but a League of Nation's Court" 110 is fully answered by
Judge Hudson 171 who shows that not even the farmer's financial support is derived from the latter. The connection between the two is,
therefore, much less than that between the United States Supreme
Court and Congress. Nevertheless, it was necessary for some international body to initiate the movement which led to the execution of the
Protocol and to keep the institution going by selecting its personnel.
The first step was taken by the League of Nations Council and to repeat
it would be a waste of time and energy; the second is a continuing process which the same body, though now dormant, continued to provide
unti1 the Court, through the exigencies of global war, was compelled to
suspend its functions. The question of continuing the League is not a
part of our theme; but it is well to remember that something like it is
indispensable to the maintenance of any international court.112 Here
again the question arises whether there would be any gain by discarding
an institution which has functioned successfully for nearly a quarter of
a century merely to provide for the exercise of similar functions in the
169
See Kelsen, "Compulsory Adjudication of International Disputes," 37 AM. J.
INT. L. 397 at 399 (1943); Rogers, "The Law Above Nations," 37 id. 305; Wright,
''National Security and International Police," 37 id. 499; Corbett, "World Order-An
Agenda for Lawyers," 37 id. 207 at 217.
170
See also the reservation proposed by Senator Reed of Missouri, 67 CONG. REc.
2676 (1926). Cf. Senate Ex. Doc. 1, 72d Cong., 1st sess., p. 32.
171
"The Independence of the Permanent Court of International Justice," 17
A.B.A.J. 430 (1931). Indeed "it would seem [to him] that the Assembly made no
effort to give ••• effect to the [World Court] Statute. It is through the Protocol of
Signature that the Powers have breathed life into it." Hudson, "Advisory Opinions of
National and International Courts," 37 HARV. L. REv. 970 at 988n, (1924).
172
" • • • It is commonly recognized that the Permanent Court of International
Justice rendered good service and the assumption is made that we need simply put it in
operation again, with enlarged jurisdiction and possibly a few improvements of structure. What escapes atte}!tion is that the composition of the court was a delicate compromise between the demand of the greater States for representation and the claim of
the smaller States to legal equality and that the success of the compromise depended on
the election simultaneously in the Council and in the Assembly of the League of
Nations. Unless, therefore, we assume that the League will be reestablished in more or
less the· same form, it becomes necessary to devise some other way of manning our
World Court." Corbett, "World Order-An Agenda for Lawyers," 37 AM. J. INT. L.
207 at 215, 216 (1943).
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same way by another.173 The insinuatio~ that there has been anything
sinister in the relation between the League and the Permanent Court
is pure fiction.

III
THE OUTLOOK FOR ADHERENCE

It is interesting to learn from an authoritative source that "the
[World] Court Statute is now being adapted to the new General Organization." 174 But the question presented to the Senate should not be
complicated or confused with proposals for changing the Statute. Every
such proposal offers a new excuse for some isolationist Senator to oppost!
the .whole project. In seeking simple repeal of reservations and provisos, proponents of the Court should be ca.reful not to invite new ones.
It is encouraging also to note that the-membership of the Senate
seems to have become more internationally minded since 1935. The old
time isolationists are mostly gone,175 and meanwhile new members have
come in, who sense the dire consequences of isolation.mi Again, popular
173

"I hope we shall not lightly cast aside all the immense work which was accomplished by the creation of the League of Nations." Prime Minister Churchill's add_ress
of March 21, 1943, NEW YORK TIMES, March 22, 1943, 4:1-8.
Cf. THE SHOTWELL COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, 4th
rep., 15 (1943) recommending that, "The international organization should build
upon the foundations already laid in the League of Nations and its allied institutions,
making use of whatever may be found serviceable in their experience and organization."
"I do believe that a league of sovereign nations, agreeing upon a rule of law and
order throughout the world, has a real chance of success. . •• It should provide . • •
for the submission of all disputes involving such laws to a world court. . . . I would
prefer to build the association on the old League of Nations." Senator Taft in NEW
YoRK TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 6, 1944, 8:4, 34:2.
Cf. similar expressions by Senator Conally, NEw YoRK TIMES, March 28, 1945,
38 :1-2.
174 A despatch from Washington to the NEW YoRK TIMES of March 28, 1945,
16:5, sates that "jurists representing the United Nations .•.. wilI meet in
Washington April 9 to draft the Statute for the International Court" and to decide
"whether [it] will be a modified f9rm of the existing statute ••. or ••. an entirely
new [one] ... using the old ... as a basis.... State Department experts ... feel that,
with some amendments, the [ existing] statute offers a tested and workable instrument,
permitting rapid creation of the court." The only proposed "amendments" mentioned
are: (1) "to eliminate all reference to the League of Nations"; (2) "to introduce into
the Statute a provision for its own amendment"; (3) selection of Judges "by a meeting
of the representatives of the member governments"; (4) more .effective sanctions. Such
changes would not impair the Court's identity or status.
175
Of the seventeen who voted against adherence on Jan. 27, 1926, only Senators
Johnson (Cal., now inactive) and LaFollette (Wis.) remain. Of the seven Senators
who, while voting for adherence in 1926, voted against it in 1935, only two--Gerry
and Wheeler-remain. Others retiring in 1944 included Smith (S. C.), Reynolds
(N. C.), Clark (Mo.), Clark (Idaho) and Holman (Ore.).
176 E.g. the four Senators who sponsored the BBHH Resolution. Fullbright of
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interest in the Court has been reviving as we 'approach the multitudinous problems of the post-war era. Its retention has been favored at two
sessions of the Inter-American Bar Association (Rio de Janeiro, 1943
and Mexico City, 1944) and the group of lawyers whose discussions
bore fruit in a recent American Bar Association publication 171 while a
committee of the same Association 178 recommended "continuance and
extension of the Court." The American Bar Association, at its l 944
session, reaffirmed its traditional position by resolving that "the World
Court should be continued as the highest tribunal of an accessible system of interrelated permanent international courts with obligatory
jurisdictions." 179
Official utterances on the subject have not however been so explicit.
At the Mackinac Republican Governors' Conference of September l 7,
l 943, Governor Baldwin of Connecticut called for "a world court to
decide justiciable disputes between nations." But the Senate (Connally)
resolution of November 5, following, failed to mention any court.
President Roosevelt's outline of world organization, announced June
15, 1944, used language similar to Governor Baldwin's; so did the
"general agreement" of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference ( announced
on August 29, following) and Governor Dewey in his Louisville ~peech
of September 8. These expressions would apply equally well to an entirely new tribunal which, as we have seen,180 would mean the loss of
most that our World Court has accomplished. Fortunately the."tentative proposals" 181 emanating from this Conference and ·indorsed by the
Arkansas is one of the new Senators with an international outlook. On Jan. 24, 1945,
16 of the incoming Senators joined in a letter to the President favoring "the formation at the earliest moment of a United Nations organization, to establish and preserve
the peace of the world, along the general lines tentatively drafted at Dumbarton Oaks."
NEw YoRK TIMES, Jan. 25, 1945, 5:3. The World Court, however, was not mentioned specifically.
177
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE FUTIJltE 102, 168 (1944).
178
See NEW YoRK TIMES, July 30, 1944, 22:1, 2. This recommendation includes
proposals for circuit courts, changes in mode of electing judges and in jurisdiction, etc.
But the group mentioned in note l 75 deprecated "any attempt to draft a new Statute.
Such an attempt might reopen many questions to which solutions have already been
given, and it seems doubtful whether a more satisfactory instrument would result."
179
30 A.B.A.J. 547 (1944).
180
See division II, subdivision 3 at p. 8 5 5, supra.
181
"The statute of the Court of International Justice should be either (a) the
statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, continued in force with such
modifications as may be desirable or (b) a new statute in the preparation of which the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice should be used as a basis."
PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION,
c. 7, § 3 (1944); reprinted in NEW YoRK TIMES, Oct. 10, 1944, 12:4. Cf. letters
of George A. Finch in NEw YORK TIMES, Oct. 22, 1944, SE: 7, James W. Ryan, id.
March 15, 1945, 22:6-7.
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same President on October 9, I 944 are much more satisfactory. But the
report of the "Crimea Conference" of Feb. 4-r2, r945, announces
"a general organization" whose "foundations were laid at Dumbarton
Oaks" and "a conference 182 of the United Nations· at San Francisco •.•
on April 2 5, to prepare the charter of such an organization" and there
is no mention of any court. We should not, however, ignore the unpleasant fact that other nations have become suspicious of ours because
of the course pursued by our Senate. Action by it now would relieve
that feeling and render easier the subsequent steps in a world program.
When our Senate has put itself on record as adhering to the Court without reservations or provisos, our lost leadership may be regained and
other peace proposals by the United States are likely to meet a more
favorable reception.
Finally this revival of interest in the court project may not continue.
Post-war problems of seemingly more pressing importance may crowd
it from the conference tables. If we wait until all such problems are disposed of, the World Court is likely to be forgotten. But let us not forget that the present Court was unable to open until nearly three years
after the Versailles Treaty had been signed.
. Once more the opportunity comes to us, not only to retrieve the
tragic mistake of former years but to make amends for it. Our Senate
· is now in a position not merely to adhere to the Permanent Court Protocol, unreservedly, but to save the Court itself and to preserve the results of its 'Work for the generations to come. But before it reaches the
Senate the Protocol faces the San Francisco Conference which is "to prepare the Charter" of the United Nations within which the court provisions will almost certainly be inch1ded. May the friends of the Court
rise to these occasions.
182

To be known officially as "the Conference ... on International Organization."

